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COMMENTS
“YOU MAY BE DOWN AND OUT,
BUT YOU AIN’T BEATEN”:
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR
INCARCERATED WORKERS
KEITH ARMSTRONG*
The Supreme Court’s sweeping 1977 decision in Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union determined that a state’s reasonable
interest in maintaining security in a correctional facility outweighed
prisoners’ freedom of association in seeking to unionize. This decision had
a chilling effect on a burgeoning prisoners’ union movement which had risen
to prominence over the course of the 1970s. Since Jones, prison labor has
increased and changed form: the Prison Industry Enhancement (PIE) Act of
1979 authorized private firms to sell prisoner-made goods on the open
market. At the same time, prisoners continue to work in more traditional
jobs within prisons, such as cooking, cleaning, and manufacturing license
plates.
After Jones, prisoners have not been able to assert a constitutional right
to associate, but they have continued to struggle for labor protections. These
efforts have mostly taken the form of unauthorized prison strikes. The largest
recent strike involved inmates in over seventeen states.
Issues involving prison labor have moved to the forefront of
conversations on criminal justice reform. Recently, scholars have examined
the ways in which unions of incarcerated workers might make use of federal
* J.D.-LL.M. International Human Rights, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2021. A
heartfelt thank you to all who played a part in this endeavor. Professor Alan Mills provided
thoughtful feedback and advice on the early drafts of this article. Members of the Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology helped bring this article to fruition in its final form with
diligent edits and helpful comments, specifically Emelia Carroll, Ellie Graham, Mohit
Agarwal, Mason Willis, Elliot Knuths, and Mike Trucco. Finally, Abigail Sexton supported
me in countless ways throughout the writing and revision process.
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labor law, including the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to gain
recognition as collective bargaining units. However, even if these efforts
succeed, their impacts would be limited to incarcerated workers involved in
the PIE program or to those working in private industries in private prisons.
The vast majority of incarcerated workers who do not work in private
industries would be excluded.
As a complementary approach, and in order to expand labor protections
to those incarcerated workers who would not be covered by the NLRA,
incarcerated workers may also wish to look to state labor law for protections.
This Comment surveys state public employee collective bargaining statutes.
Some states categorically exclude prisoners from their definition of “public
employee” or do not permit any association of public employees to engage
in collective bargaining. However, other states have broad definitions that
could conceivably include prisoners. Advocates of incarcerated worker
union organizing may wish to focus their efforts on these states. If
incarcerated worker unions are able to organize under state or federal labor
law, then they may eventually be able to demonstrate that such associations
are beneficial rather than detrimental to maintaining order in prisons, which
could help chip away at the overbroad holding in Jones.
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INTRODUCTION
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc. 1 seemed to signal
a death-knell for labor organizing in the prison setting. 2 Writing for the
Supreme Court, Justice Rehnquist held that a state’s reasonable interest in
maintaining security in a correctional facility outweighs the freedom of
association of prisoners seeking to unionize. 3 In spite of this decision,
associations of incarcerated workers have persevered over the past forty
years. In August 2018, prison labor organizing gained national prominence
when inmates in over seventeen states organized a major prison strike 4 in
which participants called for “an immediate end to prison slavery.” 5
Furthermore, they demanded that “[a]ll persons imprisoned in any place of
detention . . . be paid the prevailing wage in their state or territory for their
labor.” 6 The striking prisoners made a series of other concrete requests,
including broad reforms to prison conditions. 7
1

Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
See Sidney Zonn, Inmate Unions: An Appraisal of Prisoner Rights and Labor
Implications, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 613, 614 (1978) (“The continued vitality of [prisoner labor
unions] is now threatened due to the recent Supreme Court decision of Jones v. North Carolina
Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc.”).
3
Jones, 433 U.S. at 133.
4
Nicole Lewis, What’s Really Happening With the National Prison Strike?, THE
MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/08/24/what-s
-really-happening-with-the-national-prison-strike [https://perma.cc/YRR3-9AUF]. This strike
was organized with the support of the Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee of the
Industrial Workers of the World. Id.
5
Amani Sawari & Jared Ware, The Incarcerated Workers Org. Comm., Statement
regarding the ongoing Nationwide Prison Strike, INCARCERATED WORKERS ORGANIZING
COMMITTEE (Aug. 28, 2018), https://incarceratedworkers.org/news/strike-statement-press-au
gust-28-2018 [https://perma.cc/3FGM-MTA9].
6
Id.
7
Id. Similarly, the union in Jones sought to establish labor protections and effective
grievance mechanisms in prison, among other demands. 433 U.S. at 119. While the demands
of the prisoners in the 2018 strike encompass more than strictly “labor” conditions, many other
past incarcerated worker labor unions have also focused on hybrid goals and sought broader
protections. See Zonn, supra note 2, at 614. In part, this is because of the totality of the prison
experience; prison labor conditions are inextricable from other elements of prison life. Like
its predecessors, the Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee identifies itself as a labor
organization, although a number of the reforms that it called for through the 2018 strike were
related to prison conditions more broadly.
2
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This Comment examines the current legal landscape for incarcerated
worker organizing and posits that while constitutional arguments for prisoner
labor unions are not currently a viable option, labor law may provide some
protections. This premise follows in the footsteps of a recent article by Eric
Fink 8 and a Note by Kara Goad. 9 Both authors have explored whether
incarcerated worker unions might seek National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) certification as collective bargaining units. However, given that the
vast majority of prisoners—and incarcerated workers—are held in state
prisons and work directly for the prison or the state, they would not fall under
the mandate of the NLRB. 10 As a result, incarcerated workers in such
circumstances must look to state law in order to assert collective bargaining
rights. By receiving recognition at the state level and then demonstrating that
labor organizing in the prison setting is not a threat to prison security,
incarcerated worker unions may be able to build a body of evidence that
could one day challenge Justice Rehnquist’s conclusion in Jones.
Part I of this Comment discusses why prisoner labor organizing is an
especially important and timely issue for advocates of criminal justice
reform, racial justice, and labor rights.
Part II explores the history of First Amendment freedom of association
litigation surrounding incarcerated worker labor unions both before and after
Jones and examines how the decision has impacted modern efforts to
organize prison labor.
Part III examines the statutory protections that may apply to
incarcerated workers under the NLRA. In order to unpack the threshold issue
of whether prisoners are included in the statute’s definition of “employee,”
this Comment reviews a number of cases brought by inmates under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), a statute with a similar definition of the term,
which was passed contemporaneously with the NLRA.
Finally, Part IV analyzes the applicability of state statutes governing
public employees’ collective bargaining rights to incarcerated workers. Most
recent scholarship on incarcerated worker labor organizing focuses on the
viability of claims under the NLRA but acknowledges that even successful
claims will only apply to a fraction of inmates who work in private industries.
This Comment suggests that in order to build a successful movement and win
protections for a larger number of incarcerated workers, those workers must
seek recognition as public employees at the state level in states with robust
8
Eric M. Fink, Union Organizing & Collective Bargaining for Incarcerated Workers, 52
IDAHO L. REV. 953 (2016).
9
Kara Goad, Note, Columbia University and Incarcerated Worker Labor Unions Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 177 (2017).
10
29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-63).
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collective bargaining statutes. To that end, this Comment identifies which
states have public sector collective bargaining statutes that could conceivably
include prisoners and examines past decisions by state employment relations
boards that denied labor protections to prisoners. This will clarify the
challenges that incarcerated worker labor unions may face and shed new light
on how to confront them.
I. THE GROWING NEED FOR REFORM
Concerns about prison labor have become a central issue in national
conversations around criminal justice. Shortly before the start of the 2018
prison strike, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
tweeted, “Today, more than 2,000 volunteer inmate firefighters, including 58
youth offenders, are battling wildfire flames throughout CA. Inmate
firefighters serve a vital role, clearing thick brush down to the bare soil to
stop the fire’s spread.” 11 Further reporting revealed that these inmate
firefighters were only paid two dollars per day, plus one dollar per hour, for
this grueling and dangerous work. 12 During a harsh winter storm in Chicago,
a photo posted to social media showing inmates shoveling snow “with no real
winter gear” went viral. 13 The Cook County Sheriff’s Office later issued a
statement that the people in the photo had, in fact, been provided with
insulated jumpsuits, gloves, hats, and boots, though they were still working
outdoors in inhospitable conditions. 14 When Senator Kamala Harris
announced her candidacy for the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination,
journalists quickly uncovered a brief filed by the California Attorney
General’s office in 2014, then led by Harris, which argued against reducing
California’s prison population because it would shrink the state’s pool of
cheap labor. 15
11

CA Corrections (@CACorrections), TWITTER (July 31, 2018, 6:40 PM), https://twitter.
com/cacorrections/status/1024439641221419008?s=21 [https://perma.cc/55Q8-T7XS].
12
See, e.g., Abigail Hess, California is Paying Inmates $1 an Hour to Fight Wildfires,
CNBC (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/14/california-is-paying-inmates-1-an
-hour-to-fight-wildfires.html [https://perma.cc/9T9W-RBEG]. Despite the experience that
these inmate firefighters gain in the field, their criminal history generally bars them from
finding employment as a firefighter upon release. Id.
13
Morgan Greene, Viral Photo of Cook County Jail Inmates Shoveling Sparks Backlash,
CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-cook
-county-jail-inmates-shoveling-cold-photo-20190129-story.html [https://perma.cc/2Q5W-9R
E7].
14
Id.
15
Kate Zernike, ‘Progressive Prosecutor’: Can Kamala Harris Square the Circle?, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/11/us/kamala-harris-progressive-p
rosecutor.html [https://perma.cc/9R77-8FA3]. Senator Harris stated that she was unaware of
the brief. Id.
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Advocates for criminal justice reform have many reasons to be
concerned about prison labor. First, incarcerated workers have few legal
rights or labor protections possessed by their non-incarcerated counterparts. 16
As of 2016, approximately 188,400 people were incarcerated in federal
prisons, and state prisons held another 1,228,800 individuals. 17 This puts a
large number of people at risk of extreme exploitation. While the Department
of Justice has not published its Census of State and Federal Correctional
Facilities since 2005, the findings of that year’s census show that nearly fiftyfour percent of all inmates (state and federal) were held in facilities that
operated work programs and that ninety-eight percent of federal inmates
were held in facilities with work programs. 18 Federal law requires federal
inmates to work if they are medically able, 19 and many states have similar
policies. 20 Some states pay incarcerated workers for their labor, while others,
such as Texas, which has the largest state prison population in the United
States, do not. 21 Even where prisoners are paid, they “work under unusually
intense conditions for unusually low wages.” 22 This has led many to
characterize prison labor as “modern-day slavery” 23 or as a form of
“superexploitation.” 24
Second, prison labor is an issue of racial justice. Prison labor in North
America has its roots in seventeenth-century Pennsylvania and expanded
over the course of the nineteenth century under the theory that labor could
lead to moral reform, 25 but it took on strong racial undertones following the
16

Fink, supra note 8, at 955.
DANIELLE KAEBLE & MARY COWHIG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, BJS BULL. NO. NCJ 251211, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,
2016 12 (2018).
18
JAMES J. STEPHAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 2005 5 (2008).
19
WORK PROGRAMS, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmates/custodyand
_care/work_programs.jsp [https://perma.cc/P8R2-L2TS] (last visited Oct. 10, 2019).].
20
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148–26 (2017).
21
Jason Renard Walker, Unpaid Labor in Texas Prisons Is Modern-Day Slavery,
TRUTHOUT (Sept. 6, 2016), https://truthout.org/articles/unpaid-labor-in-texas-prisons-is-mode
rn-day-slavery/ [https://perma.cc/L82U-JT5M].
22
Fink, supra note 8, at 964.
23
Walker, supra note 21.
24
Fink, supra note 8, at 963. The concept of “superexploitation” originated in Marxist
theory, but also has a broader definition reflecting a population working under intense
conditions for extraordinarily low wages, facing extreme social exclusion, and experiencing a
long-term state of subordination. Id. at 963–64.
25
Stephen P. Garvey, Freeing Prisoners’ Labor, 50 STAN. L. REV. 339, 347–50 (1998).
In William Penn’s 1682 Frame of Government for Pennsylvania, he wrote, “all prisons shall
17
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Civil War. 26 The Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery,
infamously created an exception in the case of prison labor: “Neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.” 27 As the post-war Reconstruction Era
came to an abrupt end, many Southern states exploited this exception by
enacting vagrancy statutes, which made it a criminal offense not to work. 28
These laws were selectively applied to African Americans, allowing a form
of racial hierarchy and labor exploitation to continue after slavery’s
abolishment. 29
During the Jim Crow era, vagrancy laws expanded and labor conditions
deteriorated as Southern states contracted out convicts to private entities. 30
In her landmark examination of mass incarceration, The New Jim Crow,
Michelle Alexander writes, “Death rates were shockingly high, for the
private contractors had no interest in the health and well-being of their
laborers, unlike the earlier slave-owners who needed their slaves, at a
minimum, to be healthy enough to survive hard labor.” 31 The context of
prison labor has changed over the years, but minorities remain
overrepresented in the prison system, and as a result, in the prison labor
pool. 32
Third, prison labor is—as the term suggests—a labor issue. Some
contemporary progressive commentators argue that unions should take a
proactive stance in support of incarcerated workers in the name of defending
working class interests beyond the narrower interests of any individual

be work-houses, for felons, vagrants, and loose and idle persons.” William Penn, Frame of
Government of Pennsylvania, The Avalon Project, YALE LAW SCHOOL LILLIAN GOLDMAN
LAW LIBRARY (2008), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/pa04.asp [https://perma.cc/F
CG3-WXM9]. After the American Revolution, Philadelphia’s Walnut Street Jail served as an
early experiment in the modern penitentiary, with prisoners producing goods for private
contractors, while supervised by the state. Garvey at 349. Prison labor expanded in the early
1800s, with the establishment of New York’s Auburn Prison and Pennsylvania’s Cherry Hill
Prison. Id. at 349–50.
26
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 28 (rev. ed. 2010).
27
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
28
ALEXANDER, supra note 26, at 28.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 31.
31
Id.
32
The NAACP estimates that African Americans are incarcerated at a rate five times
greater than the rate at which whites are incarcerated. NAACP, CRIMINAL JUSTICE FACT
SHEET, https://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/2XFK-QN7B].
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However, the historical relationship between
union’s members. 33
incarcerated workers and labor unions has been much more fraught and
complicated. There have been two primary reasons why labor unions have
taken a stand against prison labor. At first, in the mid-nineteenth century,
unions distanced themselves from prison labor because of “the need to
preserve the dignity of free labor.” 34 Later, unions objected to the “economic
menace of prison labor” as prison industries became more profitable and
posed a competitive threat to organized labor outside prison walls. 35 This
threat led unions to call for reforms to prison labor around the turn of the
twentieth century, including paying prisoners the prevailing wage, limiting
the number of hours inmates could work, and banning prison-made goods
from entering inter-state commerce. 36 Though labor unions called for prison
labor reform out of their own self-interest, their advocacy sometimes
simultaneously helped advance prisoners’ interests. 37 However, apart from
the Industrial Workers of the World’s (“IWW”) Incarcerated Workers
Organizing Committee, which helped organize the 2018 prison strike, 38 there
is little evidence of the broader labor movement taking up the cause of prison
labor in recent years.
Based on these three issues—concerns about mass exploitation, racial
justice, and labor rights—advocates from many sectors have good reason to
support prisoner labor organizing. After all, prisoner-led organizing, both
within and outside of the labor context, has an impressive track record. For
33

See James Kilgore, Mass Incarceration and Working Class Interests: Which Side Are
the Unions On?, 34 LAB. STUD. J. 356, 357 (2013).
34
Garvey, supra note 25, at 359.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 361–62.
37
Recent cases continue to highlight the complicated relationship between labor unions
and incarcerated labor. In Washington Water Jet Workers Association v. Yarbrough, an
association of workers using water jet cutting technology sued a company that contracted
prison labor to do similar work. 90 P.3d 42 (Wash. 2004). A persistent challenge for linking
prison labor concerns to the broader labor movement has been the power of correctional
officers unions, which have resisted calls for prison reform. See Mike Elk, The Next Step for
Organized Labor? People in Prison, THE NATION (July 11, 2016), https://www.thenation.co
m/article/the-next-step-for-organized-labor-people-in-prison/ [https://perma.cc/6F76-NCB2];
James Ridgeway & Jean Casella, Big Labor’s Lock ‘Em Up Mentality, MOTHER JONES (Feb.
22, 2013), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/02/biggest-obstacle-prison-reformlabor-unions/ [https://perma.cc/2U88-4GNJ]. Some are more optimistic about the prospects
of uniting correctional officer unions with the interests of prisoners, at least in limited
circumstances. See Austin McCoy, Prison Guard Unions and Mass Incarceration: Prospects
for an Improbable Alliance, 26 NEW LAB. F. 74, 79 (2017) (“[P]rivatization has at times served
as fertile ground for prison worker and inmate solidarity, as . . . in the case of privatized food
service [in Ohio prisons].”).
38
See Sawari & Ware, supra note 5.
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example, prisoner movements played a crucial role in convincing the
Supreme Court to recognize that prisoners had any legal rights whatsoever. 39
Despite implicating numerous constitutional issues, the Supreme Court
rarely addressed issues concerning prisoners’ rights for nearly two
centuries. 40 Then, in the early 1960s, courts began to show an increased
willingness to weigh in on prisoners’ constitutional rights, due in large part
to the growing prisoner rights movement. 41 As noted by the Center for
Constitutional Rights and the National Lawyers’ Guild, “[P]risoners did not
begin to win many important court decisions until the prison movement grew
strong.” 42
Following the Attica Prison Uprising of 1971, the prisoners’ rights
movement “evolved into three primary branches: a prison abolitionist
movement . . . ; a prison union movement that attempted to deliver the tactics
of labor mobilization behind bars; and a legal, civil rights, and social struggle
over prison overcrowding and the denial of prisoners’ rights.” 43 Each branch
brought its own set of court cases, with the prisoner labor union movement
seeing some hopeful signs from the courts between 1972 and 1977. 44
In 1977, though, Jones dashed these hopes. The decision signaled the
end of an era in which the Supreme Court had taken a few modest steps to
expand the protection of prisoners’ First Amendment rights. 45 Writing for
the Court in Jones, Justice Rehnquist said that prisoners’ freedom of
association “must give way to the reasonable considerations of penal
management.” 46 If prison administrators felt that a prisoner labor union
39

Jack E. Call, The Supreme Court and Prisoners’ Rights, 59 FED. PROB. 36, 36 (1995).
See id. This hands-off approach stemmed from concerns about separation of powers,
the Court’s lack of expertise in matters related to prison administration, and federalism. Id.
41
Id. Another reason that the 1960s saw an increasing number of cases brought by
prisoners was a reinterpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape, which determined
that § 1983 was intended to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights by
officials’ abuse of their respective positions. 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). This opened the door
for prisoners to bring claims in court that would not have been previously heard, and forms
the backbone of much modern prison litigation. See MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983
LITIGATION 15 (Kris Markarian ed., 3d ed. 2014); THE CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
& THE NATIONAL LAWYERS’ GUILD, THE JAILHOUSE LAWYER’S HANDBOOK 5 (Rachel
Meeropol & Ian Head eds., 5th ed. 2010) [hereinafter Jailhouse Lawyer’s Handbook].
42
Jailhouse Lawyer’s Handbook, supra note 41, at 5.
43
Robert T. Chase, We Are Not Slaves: Rethinking the Rise of Carceral States through
the Lens of the Prisoners’ Rights Movement, 102 J. AM. HIST. 73, 75–76 (2015).
44
This string of cases will be discussed in greater detail in Part II.A., infra.
45
Bradley B. Falkof, Comment, Prisoner Representative Organizations, Prison Reform,
and Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union: An Argument for Increased Court
Intervention in Prison Administration, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 42, 50 (1979).
46
Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Union, 433 U.S. 119, 132 (1977).
40
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would be a threat, they were constitutionally permitted to take reasonable
steps to forestall that threat, including barring the union from meeting or
recruiting members or prohibiting bulk mailings from the union. 47 This
decision essentially halted litigation around incarcerated workers’ labor
unions.
In the years since Jones, prison labor has both increased and changed
form, beginning with the PIE Act of 1979, which allows some firms to sell
prisoner-made goods on the open market. 48 Since the enactment of the PIE
Act, more private enterprises have begun to use prison labor. 49 In addition to
working for private industries, inmates still work in more traditional jobs
within prisons, such as food service, maintenance, and making road signs and
license plates.
Presently, incarcerated people face many risks for organizing behind
bars, an act which mostly takes place covertly as a matter of necessity. For
instance, they may be put on a Security Threat Group list that could
negatively impact their chance of early release or parole. 50 Reprisals against
prisoners who organize reflect a fear on the part of prison administrators that
prison organizing may lead—or be connected—to violence. Indeed, in
Jones, Justice Rehnquist expressed concern that prisoner unions would
disrupt “prison order or stability, or otherwise interfere with the legitimate
penological objectives of the prison environment.” 51 In the years following
the decision, the perception of prisons as hotbeds of violent gang activity has
only grown. 52 However, some scholars have noted that incarcerated worker
unions can provide a constructive outlet for prisoners to express grievances
and may lead to correctional and rehabilitative benefits. 53 Indeed, countries
such as Denmark and Sweden permit inmate unions, and union activity there
47

Id.
Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96–157, § 827, 93 Stat. 1167
(1979) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1761). Prior to the enactment of the PIE Act, the
Hawes-Cooper Act of 1929 and the Ashurst-Sumners Act of 1935 had barred private
companies from using prison labor and from allowing states to profit from the interstate sale
of prison-made goods. Garvey, supra note 25, at 366.
49
Garvey, supra note 25, at 372.
50
Organizing the Prisoner Class: An Interview with IWOC, IT’S GOING DOWN (Apr. 30,
2016), https://itsgoingdown.org/organizing-prisoner-class-interview-iwoc/ [https://perma.cc/
HDG2-M5VX].
51
Jones, 433 U.S. at 132.
52
See Graeme Wood, How Gangs Took Over Prisons, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/10/how-gangs-took-over-prisons/37933
0/ [https://perma.cc/WE9S-XTKH].
53
See, e.g., Luis Jorge DeGraffe, Prisoners’ Unions: A Potential Contribution to the
Rehabilitation of the Incarcerated, 16 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 221, 233–
34 (1990).
48
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has been linked to lower rates of recidivism. 54 However, it will be difficult
for prisoners in the United States to make a case for the rehabilitative benefits
of organizing. After Jones, incarcerated workers seeking to organize face a
catch-22: they will be hard-pressed to show that their unions do not pose a
threat to prison stability and security unless they are first permitted to
organize. 55
II. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION FOR INCARCERATED WORKERS
A. THE HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION REGARDING
INCARCERATED WORKER LABOR UNIONS

Inmates in California established the first modern incarcerated worker
labor union in 1970 following strikes at Soledad Prison and Folsom Prison. 56
These strikes coalesced into the United Prisoners’ Union, an association of
California prisoners that focused on a wide range of issues including
indeterminate sentences, worker’s compensation, minimum wage, parole
board policy, and medical care. 57 The movement spread, and by 1972, three
groups in California worked to form local prisoner unions while other groups
took root in New York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. 58
As the prisoner labor union movement gained momentum in the early
1970s, some federal courts seemed poised to accept that these unions should
be afforded constitutional protections. However, the proposed standards for
freedom of association afforded to these unions varied from court to court.
One early district court case, National Prisoners Reform Association v.
Sharkey, provided injunctive relief to a group of prisoners whose warden had
blocked them from forming an association. 59 In its decision, the court wrote,
“There is a high probability that, on the merits, it will be found that there is
a First Amendment right to associate . . . for the reasons that plaintiff has
organized,” including improving prison conditions. 60 Balanced against this
potential First Amendment right, the court found that the defendant prison
warden had not “come near to presenting that minimum quantum of evidence
needed to demonstrate the presence of an important government interest.” 61
Even at the lowest level of scrutiny, states must demonstrate that the disputed
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Id. at 225.
Zonn, supra note 2, at 630.
Id. at 621.
Frank Browning, Organizing Behind Bars, 10 RAMPARTS 40, 43 (1972).
Id. at 42.
Nat’l Prisoners Reform Ass’n v. Sharkey, 347 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (D.R.I. 1972).
Id. at 1238.
Id.
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conduct furthers a legitimate interest. 62 In this case, the court found the
prisoners’ constitutional interest more compelling than the government’s
interest, especially since the defendant prison warden explicitly stated that he
did not view the organization as a threat. 63 The defendant did not appeal the
decision, so no higher court ruled on the merits of the case.
In Goodwin v. Oswald, a group of prisoners filed suit after prison
officials intercepted letters between them and their lawyers discussing the
foundation of a union. 64 Despite the fact that the contents of the letters dealt
with a union, Judge Smith, writing for the court, avoided ruling on the
legality of such an organization:
We are not faced on this appeal with the question of the constitutionality or legality of
unions or other organizations of prisoners . . . . We do not therefore intimate any views
as to the legality, desirability, dangers, or possible benefits of any type of prisoner
collective bargaining on prison working conditions or of any other organized
representation of prisoners. 65

Rather than ruling on prisoners’ freedom of association, the decision
turned on the fact that the prison withheld letters sent by the prisoners’
lawyers, implicating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 66 The Second
Circuit agreed with the trial court that “the letter was a communication of
legal advice, not a call to illegal action, and that its optimism about the
formation of a union was carefully hedged with cautionary instructions to
obey all prison rules in the interim . . . .” 67 Thus, as in Sharkey, the court
avoided determining whether or not prisoners had a First Amendment
freedom of association to form a union.
Other district court decisions sought to balance the First Amendment
rights of the prisoner against the state’s interest involved in restricting that
right, following Pell v. Procunier. 68 In this vein, the District Court of
Connecticut applied the Pell balancing test in Paka v. Manson and found that

62

See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
Id.
64
Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237, 1238–39 (2d. Cir. 1972).
65
Id. at 1239.
66
Id. at 1240.
67
Id.
68
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (“[C]hallenges to prison restrictions that
are asserted to inhibit First Amendment interests must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate
policies and goals of the corrections system, to whose custody and care the prisoner has been
committed in accordance with due process of law.”).
63
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the state had a compelling interest in restricting the activities of a prisoners’
union in the name of prison security. 69
Despite the lack of a definitive answer from a higher court about the
constitutional protections afforded to incarcerated worker labor unions, these
lower court cases—and other contemporary First Amendment prison cases
heard by the Supreme Court, such as Procunier v. Martinez 70—signaled that
federal courts might apply more exacting scrutiny to some First Amendment
rights of prisoners, including freedom of association. However, Jones
deviated from this trend by dramatically curtailing prisoners’ freedom of
association.
B. JONES AND ITS CHILLING EFFECT ON PRISONER LABOR
UNIONS

In Jones, a group of inmates formed a labor union which sought to
improve working conditions in a North Carolina prison through collective
bargaining. 71 The union also hoped to serve as a mechanism to address
broader inmate grievances. 72 However, the prison administration adopted
policies barring the union from meeting, both declining to deliver bulk
mailings of union publications and preventing inmates in the union from
recruiting new members. 73 A week before these regulations were set to take
effect, the union sued, claiming that the prison’s actions violated its
members’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.74
The district court found in favor of the union, but the Supreme Court
overturned this ruling. 75 The Court reasoned, based on Pell, that inmates do
not possess those First Amendment rights that are supposedly “‘inconsistent

69

Paka v. Manson, 387 F. Supp. 111, 122 (D. Conn. 1974). Zonn notes that this decision
had “aggravating circumstances which weighed heavily in favor of the State’s interest,”
including the fact that one of the organizers of the union was found to be in possession of a
letter describing a fictitious violent incident, which may have threatened the internal security
of the prison. Zonn, supra note 2, at 626 n.90.
70
See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413–14 (1974) (finding that restrictions
on censoring prisoners’ mail by imposing restrictions upon prisoners’ mailing rights are
justified if the practice furthers an “important or substantial governmental interest unrelated
to the suppression of expression,” and if the limitations on First Amendment freedoms are no
greater than necessary to protect the governmental interest).
71
Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 122 (1977).
72
Id.
73
Id. at 121.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 136.
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with [their] status as a prisoner . . . .” 76 Justice Rehnquist wrote for the
majority:
[N]umerous associational rights are necessarily curtailed by the realities of
confinement. They may be curtailed whenever the institution’s officials, in the exercise
of their informed discretion, reasonably conclude that such associations . . . possess the
likelihood of disruption to prison order or stability, or otherwise interfere with the
legitimate penological objectives of the prison environment. 77

To the Court, the fact that the union wanted to present grievances to the
administration and engage in adversarial collective bargaining provided
sufficient grounds for barring its activity so long as the prison officials felt
that these activities threatened prison security. 78 Under this decision, then,
prison systems can promulgate policies prohibiting union organizing.
Jones determined that the First Amendment did not protect prisoner
labor unions, but it did not formally ban them either. Chief Justice Burger
clarified this point in his concurrence, writing, “In determining [that the
Constitution permits prison officials to prevent unions from organizing], we
do not suggest that prison officials could not or should not permit such inmate
organizations, but only that the Constitution does not require them to do
so.” 79 Thus, while Jones has effectively resulted in the widespread
elimination of incarcerated worker unions, it leaves a door open for groups
like the IWOC who wish to pick up the mantle of inmate labor organizing
today. 80 Unions may still operate where permitted, and groups of prisoners
may still find ways to persuade prison officials that organizing to present
grievances is a worthwhile goal and not counter to penological or
rehabilitative goals.
The Jones decision was understandably viewed as a backslide on the
modest expansion of prisoners’ rights started in Martinez 81 (though Jones
76

Id. at 129 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
Id. at 132.
78
Id. at 133.
79
Id. at 137 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
80
Indeed, in addition to its more clandestine efforts in organizing the 2018 prison strike,
a group of prisoners affiliated with the Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee (IWOC)
has filed with the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) to officially become the Incarcerated
Workers Industrial Union 613, a branch of the IWW. IWOC, First Incarcerated Worker
Industrial Union Branch Forming, IT’S GOING DOWN (Jan. 18, 2018), https://itsgoingdown.o
rg/first-incarcerated-worker-industrial-union-branch-forming/ [https://perma.cc/7MRN-Y6R
6]. There have been no subsequent updates since the January 2018 announcement. The author
has contacted several local IWW chapters, as well as the national organization, in order to
learn more about this effort, but has not received further information about the Incarcerated
Workers Industrial Union 613.
81
See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413–14 (1974).
77
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approvingly cited Martinez). 82 Justice Rehnquist did not engage in the
Martinez analysis, which would have required the Court to examine whether
less restrictive limitations might be possible for any given restriction on
prisoners’ First Amendment rights. 83 He also did not examine Jones under
various other standards that could have been applied, “such as a clear and
present danger test [or a] compelling state interest test . . . . Instead, the Court
applied the less exacting standard of a rational basis test,” as noted by Sidney
Zonn, who appraised the impact and significance of Jones in 1978. 84 This
less exacting standard ultimately had a chilling effect on prisoners’ unions.
C. PRISONERS’ UNION LITIGATION AFTER JONES

A number of cases at the state and federal levels in the years after Jones
reflect the damage this case caused to First Amendment freedom of
association litigation over prison labor organizing. On the heels of Jones, the
District Court for the Middle District of Florida issued its decision in Brooks
v. Wainwright. 85 Brooks went even further than Jones, not only arguing that
prison administrators could limit prisoners’ freedom of association, but
essentially saying that prisoners had no freedom of association whatsoever. 86
Slightly more encouragingly, the California Supreme Court weighed in
on an attempted prisoner union at Soledad Prison in In re Price. 87 While the
decision cited Jones, reasoning that the wardens had not violated any
constitutional right in restricting the union’s activity, 88 the case hinged on the
potentially more generous California Penal Code Section 2600, which states,
“A person sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison . . . may during that
period of confinement be deprived of such rights, and only such rights, as

82

See, e.g., Falkof, supra note 45, at 47; Zonn, supra note 2, at 630.
Martinez, 416 U.S. at 420.
84
Zonn, supra note 2, at 628.
85
Brooks v. Wainwright, 439 F. Supp. 1335 (M.D. Fla. 1977). Interestingly, this case
concerned one of the lead organizers of the prison union from Jones, Wayne Brooks, who
attempted to organize another prisoners’ union after being transferred to a prison in Florida.
Id. at 1336. This case is also notable because Brooks enlisted the United Hotel, Motel and
Lounge Employees Union as an intervenor to argue that prisoners qualified as public
employees. Id. at 1337. However, the court found that Florida state law expressly bars state
inmates from the definition of public employees. Id. at 1339.
86
Id. at 1340 (“[O]ne of the first and most basic freedoms that inmates relinquish is the
freedom of association. Were it not so, incarceration would be meaningless and impossible,
since prisoners could come and go as they pleased under the guise of exercising the First
Amendment liberty to association with whom they wished.”).
87
In re Price, 600 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1979).
88
Id. at 1332.
83
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[are] reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 89 The court
found that the prison administrators had legitimate security concerns in mind
when they barred the prisoners’ union from meeting. 90 However, the court
wrote, “[O]ur conclusion is not carved in stone and should not be interpreted
as a permanent prohibition against reasonable prisoner activities proposed by
the union.” 91 This indicates that, despite a lack of constitutional protections
from federal courts, prisoner unions may successfully litigate in some state
courts under the right conditions. 92
A 1993 case, Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, provides the final
word at the federal level on the scope of prisoners’ rights to association. 93 In
Rowland, a prisoners’ organization sanctioned by the warden attempted to
sue the warden in forma pauperis in response to changes to prison policy. 94
Litigation in forma pauperis permits an indigent plaintiff to initiate a lawsuit
without prepaying filing fees or other court costs. 95 The Supreme Court held
that only natural persons may qualify for treatment in forma pauperis. 96
While this case concerned prisoners’ rights to association, its holding was
based on statutory, not constitutional, rights. 97 As a result, the Court did not
directly follow (or even cite) Jones. However, Rowland indicates that the
Supreme Court has continued to view prisoners’ freedom of association
unfavorably, even outside of the constitutional context, in the decades after
Jones.

89

CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600 (West 2012). This statute can be interpreted similarly to the
tests enacted in Pell and Martinez. The California Supreme Court has also interpreted this
statute to permit inmates to wear lapel pins representing prisoners’ unions, unless the Director
of Corrections can cite “past disruption caused by acquiring and wearing Union buttons” or
“specific reasons for predicting disruptions.” In re Reynolds, 599 P.2d 86, 88 (Cal. 1979).
While the prison may bar union meetings, it may not bar the expressive act of wearing a pin
or a badge. Id.
90
In re Price, 600 P.2d at 1333. It is also worth noting that this case was not tried on the
basis of any state or federal labor law. As discussed in Sections III and IV, infra, even in the
absence of associational rights, labor law may provide an avenue for incarcerated workers to
gain labor protections.
91
Id.
92
In Section IV, infra, I survey different state laws about whether prisoners may be
considered public Employees. It would be an interesting future project to survey different state
constitutional rights to freedom of association vis-à-vis prisoners’ unions. However, this is
beyond the scope of the argument presented in this piece.
93
Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194 (1993).
94
Id. at 196–97.
95
28 U.S.C.S. § 1915(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2019).
96
Rowland, 506 U.S. at 197.
97
Id. at 211.
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Following these discouraging post-Jones cases in which prisoners found
no constitutional protections for their organizing, litigation around prisoners’
unions ceased entirely. No subsequent court case has challenged the core
holding of Jones.
D. CONTEMPORARY EFFORTS AT PRISONER UNIONIZATION: THE
INCARCERATED WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE AND
THE NATIONWIDE PRISON STRIKE

Although Jones effectively stalled further litigation on constitutional
protections for prison labor unions, prisoner organizing has continued, as
demonstrated by the 2018 prison strike, its predecessor in 2016, and a major
2013 prisoner hunger strike in California involving nearly 30,000 inmates. 98
The Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee (IWOC), the entity
behind the 2016 and 2018 strikes, is a committee within the IWW that helps
support incarcerated people with self-organizing efforts. 99 It seeks to
“directly challenge prison slavery, work conditions, and the system itself:
break cycles of criminalization, exploitation, and the state-sponsored
divisions of our working class.” 100 In addition to organizing strikes and
advocating on behalf of prison labor, it makes use of other forms of protest
such as work stoppages and hunger strikes. 101 These efforts have the
potential to create operational disruptions to the industries within prisons that
rely on prison labor. 102 Because of the liminal status of prisoners—and the
ways in which they do not fall within traditional labor power dynamics—
they must resort to these varied tactics in order to seek to assert their rights.
The IWOC is not IWW’s first attempt at organizing prisoners. In 1987,
the IWW initiated its Prison Organizing Project, which sought to represent
400 Ohio inmates in collective bargaining. 103 In this early attempt at postJones prisoner organizing, the Ohio State Employment Relations Board
refused to recognize the prisoners as public employees, and the effort
98
Rory Carroll, California Prisoners Launch Biggest Hunger Strike in State’s History,
THE GUARDIAN (July 9, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/09/californiaprisoners-hunger-strike [https://perma.cc/2WB3-9MMP].
99
Organizing the Prisoner Class: An Interview with the IWOC, supra note 50.
100
IWOC Preamble, INCARCERATED WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE, https://incarcer
atedworkers.org/iwoc-preamble [https://perma.cc/D5CL-ZWZG].
101
About, INCARCERATED WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE, https://incarceratedworker
s.org/about [https://perma.cc/4GY2-2CKL].
102
Laignee Barron, Here’s Why Inmates in the U.S. Prison System Have Launched a
Nationwide Prison Strike, TIME (Aug. 22, 2018), http://time.com/5374133/prison-strike-labo
r-conditions/ [https://perma.cc/LVK3-2MUV].
103
IWW Chronology (1984-1989), INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD, https://iww.org/
about/chronology/9 [https://perma.cc/6XXN-DH7N].
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failed. 104 Unlike this early effort, the IWOC is not seeking formal union
recognition at present; rather, the IWW facilitates various organizing efforts
behind bars. 105
Because of the limits imposed on prisoners’ freedom of association in
Jones, IWOC members have resorted to creative and informal methods to
recruit members and gather support for their strike. To recruit members,
IWW members have combed through prison databases and sent inmates
unsolicited letters. 106 This need for direct outreach is a result of Jones’
holding concerning bulk mail: as long as other methods of outreach are
available, prohibitions on bulk mailings from unions do not violate First
Amendment rights. 107 Similarly, incarcerated IWOC members have mostly
relied on word of mouth to share information about the prison strike. 108
Though Jones limited prisoner labor unions’ options in court, prison
labor organizing has persevered and come to new prominence, though
organizers have had to shift their tactics.
III. FEDERAL STATUTORY LABOR PROTECTIONS FOR
INCARCERATED WORKERS
A. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

Although Jones found that prisoners had no constitutionally protected
First Amendment right to association, a federal labor statute may provide
protections to certain categories of incarcerated workers, including a
statutory right to unionize. Some have hypothesized that incarcerated
workers may be protected under the NLRA. 109 As noted by Eric M. Fink,
one of the first legal scholars to address incarcerated worker unions in a law
review article since the late 1970s, “The significance of Jones lies more in
104

Id. Discussed in greater detail in Part IV.C., infra.
Id.
106
Cheryl Corley, U.S. Inmates Plan Nationwide Prison Strike to Protest Labor
Conditions, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED: NPR (Aug. 21, 2018, 6:16 PM), https://www.npr.org/2
018/08/21/640630606/u-s-inmates-plan-nationwide-prison-strike-to-protest-labor-conditions
[https://perma.cc/RZ93-JFPJ]. Immediately following Jones, a law review publication noted,
“The Court did not decide whether prison administrators could extend the ban on union mail
to cover individual mailings from outside organizers to individual inmates.” Regina Montoya
& Paul Coggins, Case Comment, The Future of Prisoners’ Unions: Jones v. North Carolina
Prisoners’ Labor Union, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 799, 825 (1978). There has been no
subsequent litigation on this specific issue, but it appears that in at least some states, direct
mailing has proven to be an effective outreach tactic.
107
Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 130 (1977).
108
Corley, supra note 106.
109
Fink, supra note 8, at 966.
105
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what the Court did not decide. The majority did not hold that [the Union’s]
members were not statutory employees.” 110
If workers are found to be statutory employees under the NLRA, they
“shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, [and] to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing.” 111 However, while federal courts have determined that
inmates on work release programs may be included in a class of statutory
employees alongside non-incarcerated peers in identical jobs, and as a result
engage in collective bargaining, 112 federal courts have never determined
whether incarcerated workers in prison industries are statutory employees. 113
The NLRA’s definition of employee is expansive: “The term
‘employee’ shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the limited
to the employees of a particular employer . . . .” 114 The NLRA, however,
does not cover public employers or employees.115 As a result, any analysis
of whether incarcerated workers may be covered under the NLRA has
focused on those inmates employed either in private industries in private
prisons 116 or in the PIE program. 117
Though the NLRA is silent on whether incarcerated workers may be
considered statutory employees, a number of federal cases have examined
the circumstances under which incarcerated workers may be considered
employees under the FLSA, which includes a number of labor protections
including minimum wage requirements. As noted by Kara Goad, the FLSA
uses a similar definition of “employee” as the NLRA and is thus useful for
understanding the circumstances under which incarcerated workers may be
considered to be statutory employees. 118

110

Id. at 972. This issue did not arise in Jones because North Carolina law bars collective
bargaining by state employees, and all the prisoners in the union were employed solely in
prison operations. Id.
111
29 U.S.C. § 157 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-63).
112
Speedrack Prods. Grp. v. N.L.R.B., 114 F.3d 1276, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
113
Goad, supra note 9, at 187.
114
29 U.S.C. § 152 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-63).
115
Id. § 152(2).
116
See Goad, supra note 9, at 197.
117
See Fink, supra note 8, at 968–69.
118
Goad, supra note 9, at 188. The Fair Labor Standards Act defines an employee for
most purposes as “any individual employed by an employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2009)
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-63).
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B. PRISONERS AS STATUTORY EMPLOYEES UNDER THE FLSA

Until the 1980s, most courts did not find inmates to be employees under
the FLSA. 119 Claims by incarcerated workers against the private entities for
which they worked were generally dismissed due to a lack of “control” on
the part of the private entity. 120 However, beginning with Carter v. Dutchess
Community College, 121 several circuits reversed summary judgment and
motions to dismiss, finding that inmates were not excluded as a class from
FLSA protections. The court in Carter wrote, “We believe that courts should
refrain from exempting a whole class of workers, based on technical labels,
from the coverage of the FLSA . . . .” 122 As a result of this holding, prisoners
are not expressly excluded from FLSA coverage. 123 Rather, a court must
consider “how many typical employer prerogatives are exercised over the
inmate by the outside employer, and to what extent.” 124 This indicates a
broadening of the ways courts may be willing to examine prospective
employer-employee relationships for control.
The Fifth Circuit came to a similar conclusion in Watson v. Graves, a
case in which a Louisiana sheriff hired out prisoners to local companies for
twenty dollars per day. 125 One local company kept the prisoners out for
extended shifts and did not adequately compensate them for the additional
time, among other labor abuses. 126 The court cited Carter, finding that
inmate status does not per se prevent inquiry into FLSA coverage. 127
However, in this case, the court went a step further: not only did it reverse
the lower court’s grant of summary judgment, it actually rendered judgment
in favor of the inmates on their FLSA claims due to the egregiousness of the
violation, and only remanded in part so that the district court could calculate
how much the inmates were owed under the FLSA. 128 Applying the
“economic realities test” established in Goldberg v. Whitaker House
Cooperative, Inc. 129, which requires an examination of the substantive
realities of the relationship between two parties, rather than resorting to
119

Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the Economic
Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857, 872 (2008).
120
Id.
121
Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1984).
122
Id. at 13.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 14.
125
Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549 (5th Cir. 1990).
126
Id. at 1551.
127
Id. at 1554.
128
Id. at 1550.
129
Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28 (1961).
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“mere forms or labels,” in order to determine whether an employee is
protected by the FLSA, the court found the inmates to be employees. 130 They
were entirely unsupervised by prison officials over the course of their
employment, and the private company dictated their work schedules. 131
In Hale v. Arizona, the Ninth Circuit examined whether Arizona
inmates working in the state prison enterprise, ARCOR, could be considered
employees under the FLSA. 132 The court found that in the years since Carter,
Congress had amended the FLSA twice and did not explicitly exempt
prisoners from the Act’s coverage either time.133 The court interpreted this
silence as evidence of congressional intent not to categorically exclude
prisoners—even those working within prison walls, but for a private
employer. 134 However, the court found that the FLSA’s obligations did not
apply to the appellees in this case because of the employment program in
question. 135 ARCOR was explicitly structured to meet the state requirement
that inmates perform “hard labor” as a form of punishment, and prisoners
working in the program did so for penological purposes. 136 Because of this,
the court did not discuss which types of prison labor might affirmatively
constitute employment.
Ultimately, these cases reinforce the fact that incarcerated workers are
not excluded from federal labor protections. They may, in fact, be considered
statutory employees when working for private companies that exercise
control over various aspects of their employment, pursuant to other state
statutory requirements. Based on this, it may similarly be possible for the
NLRB to consider incarcerated workers to be statutory employees in certain
circumstances.
For a brief period of time, it appeared that the NLRB was increasingly
disposed to consider unconventional work relationships to be employment
for the purpose of union recognition. In a 2017 Comment, Kara Goad wrote
that reasoning of the 2016 NLRB decision in Columbia University, which
held that graduate student assistants were employees under the NLRA, could
potentially also encompass incarcerated workers. 137 In Columbia University,
the NLRB found that the only economic component necessary to establish an

130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137

Watson, 909 F.2d at 1554.
Id.
Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1389 (9th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1392 n.8.
Id. at 1392–93 n.8.
Id. at 1398.
Id.
Goad, supra note 9.
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employment relationship is payment on the part of the employer.138 Goad
wrote of the decision, “[A]s long as there is an employment relationship, the
existence of some other relationship not covered by the Act does not prevent
an individual from being protected as an employee.” 139 While the dual role
examined in Columbia University was student/employee, an extension of this
reasoning could have permitted incarcerated worker unions to argue that their
relationship with correctional institutions also served a dual role: part
rehabilitative/penological and part employment.140 This would have been a
promising avenue for incarcerated workers unions to pursue.
However, in September 2019, the NLRB proposed a new rule
overturning Columbia University, declaring that graduate student employees’
relationship with their universities is “primarily educational” rather than
economic. 141 The comment period for the new rule ended on January 15,
2020, and parties had an additional two weeks to respond to comments. 142 If
this new rule takes effect, it would weaken the case that incarcerated workers
should be allowed to unionize due to their dual role as inmates and workers.
As a result, it appears that a brief window of opportunity is closing.
IV. STATE PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR PROTECTIONS FOR
INCARCERATED WORKERS
A. STATE AND LOCAL-LEVEL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: WORTH
ANOTHER LOOK

As mentioned in the previous section, a favorable finding by the NLRB
would likely apply to prisoners employed in private industries in privatelyoperated prisons, and possibly those involved in the PIE program. However,
the vast majority of incarcerated workers labor outside of those two systems
and are instead employed directly by the state. 143 Because the NLRA only
138

Trs. of Columbia Univ. in N.Y., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90 at *5 (2016).
Goad, supra note 9, at 191.
140
Id. at 192–93.
141
Braden Campbell, New NLRB Rule Would Block Grad Student Unions, LAW360 (Sept.
20, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1197432 [https://perma.cc/Q6C7-NB6A].
142
Vin Gurrieri, NLRB Adds Month To Comment Period For Grad Student Rule, LAW360
(Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1223851/nlrb-adds-month-to-commentperiod-for-grad-student-rule [https://perma.cc/S3FW-96Z4].
143
Approximately 870,000 inmates worked full time in 2014. Beth Schwartzapfel, The
Great American Chain Gang: Why Can’t we Embrace the Idea that Prisoners Have Labor
Rights?, AM. PROSPECT (May 28, 2014), http://prospect.org/article/great-american-chain-gang
[https://perma.cc/8YZ4-5RFX]. However, as of June 2019, only 5,367 inmates worked in PIE
programs. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON INDUS.
139

2020]

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

615

applies to private employees, a favorable finding of inmate employee
status—even one that leads to a “pilot project” of inmate unionization, as
envisioned by Fink 144—would only have limited applicability to the broader
prisoner population. Inmates working directly for the prison or for the state
would not benefit. As a result, the vast majority of incarcerated workers in
state prisons would need to seek labor protections through other means,
namely “the hodge-podge of state and local legal frameworks” governing
collective bargaining for public-sector workers. 145
Though state and local organizing requires action on many fronts and
would likely be a more intensive effort than seeking recognition at the NLRB,
state labor relations boards overseeing public employees could be a valuable
place for incarcerated workers unions to focus their energy. This is because
incarcerated worker unions would have more bites of the apple when seeking
collective bargaining recognition. An unfavorable decision by the NLRB
might lead to a definition of “employee” that clearly excludes prisoners. 146
While such a decision would only apply to those incarcerated workers
employed by private employers, it would be a major national setback for the
incarcerated workers’ organizing movement as a whole.
On the other hand, if one state’s labor relations board rejects a union’s
application, the impact would be limited to that state. This would still pose
a setback (and, of course, prevent prisoners in that state from benefiting from
engaging in collective bargaining), but it can also help organizers and
lawyers in other states understand what the state of play might be.
Furthermore, because each state’s public employee relations laws are
distinct, incarcerated worker unions can tailor their approaches accordingly.
If one state or several states positively recognize state incarcerated workers
ENHANCEMENT CERTIFICATION PROGRAM CERTIFICATION & COST ACCOUNTING CTR LISTING,
STATISTICS FOR THE QUARTER ENDING JUNE 30, 2019 1 (2019), https://4c99dc08-46a7-4bd9-b
990-48103d668bb3.filesusr.com/ugd/74ff44_b4e2fdf1e2e1449cada258d32ad758ec.pdf [http
s://perma.cc/4SWG-P9X6].
144
See Fink, supra note 8, at 956.
145
MILLA SANES & JOHN SCHMITT, CTR. FOR ECON. AND POL’Y RESEARCH, REGULATION
OF PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE STATES, 3 (2014). As stated in a recent
student Note, “Further research is certainly necessary to develop a fuller, more nuanced
treatment of the various state and federal statutory schemes that impact prison strikes.” Yoseph
T. Desta, Note: Striking the Right Balance: Toward a Better Understanding of Prison Strikes,
132 HARV. L. REV. 1490, 1502 (2019). This Comment aims to provide a fuller, more nuanced
treatment of one aspect of state law governing prison labor organizing.
146
While there is no stare decisis in NLRB decisions, circuit courts have held that “the
Board may not depart . . . from its usual rules of decision to reach a different, unexplained
result in a single case.” NLRB v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 460 F.2d 589, 604
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supra note 9, at 187.
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as public employees and permit them to form unions, incarcerated workers
can start building an evidence base that prisoner labor unions do not
inherently pose a threat to the security of prisons. Thus, if a case challenging
Jones ever makes its way back up to the Supreme Court, incarcerated workers
unions will have more ammunition to demonstrate that the state’s interest in
limiting prisoners’ rights to association may not be as compelling as it
seemed to Justice Rehnquist at the time of Jones.
Below, this Comment examines the range of state statutes governing
public sector collective bargaining, analyzing which ones might be amenable
to recognizing incarcerated workers in state prisons as statutory
employees. 147 Next, this Comment examines several state labor relations
board decisions that rejected incarcerated workers unions in the 1970s and
1980s, unpacking the lessons from these decisions in order to develop
arguments that incarcerated labor organizers can advance in the present day.
B. PUBLIC EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAWS ON THE
STATE LEVEL: CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES FOR
INCARCERATED WORKERS

State labor laws vary, and some are more restrictive than others. By
examining the range of public sector collective bargaining statutes on the
books, advocates and organizers can gain a better understanding of where
best to focus their energy to advance the cause of incarcerated worker unions.
A number of states statutorily ban collective bargaining for all public
employees. These include North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. 148
Additionally, the Georgia and South Carolina Supreme Courts have found
that collective bargaining is illegal for most public employees.149 State
statutes in Delaware, Iowa, Florida, Maine, and Oregon explicitly exclude
inmates from their definition of “public employee.” 150 In these states, then,
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The question of whether state incarcerated workers may be considered public
employees is a threshold issue. There may be other state statutes in addition to public employee
collective bargaining statutes that could provide barriers or opportunities to organize.
148
See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95–98 (LEXIS through Sess. L. 2019-3); TEX. LOCAL GOV’T
CODE ANN. § 174.002 (Westlaw through 2019 Legis. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1–57.2
(LEXIS through 2019 Legis. Sess.).
149
See Bd. Pub. Educ. For Savannah and Chatham, 204 S.E.2d 138 (Ga. 1974); Branch v.
City of Myrtle Beach, 532 S.E.2d 289, 292 (S.C. 2000) (“Unlike private employees, public
employees in South Carolina do not have the right to collective bargaining.”).
150
See 19 DEL. CODE ANN. § 1302 (LEXIS through 82 Del. Laws ch. 218); FLA. STAT.
§ 477.203(3)(f) (LEXIS through 2019); IOWA CODE § 20.4 (2019 Legis. Sess.); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979(6)(k) (Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. 2019); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 243.650(19) (LEXIS through 2019 Sess.).
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no pathway exists for state inmates engaged in prison labor to gain
recognition as public employees for the purpose of collective bargaining.
Some states, such as Alabama, Mississippi, and West Virginia, have no
statutes whatsoever related to collective bargaining. 151 Other states only
have statutes related to collective bargaining for very limited sets of public
employees, such as firefighters, police officers, and teachers, but have no
framework or employment relations board to adjudicate labor claims brought
by public employees more broadly. 152 Thus, it would not be fruitful for
incarcerated worker unions to seek formal recognition in these states either,
although the result of such efforts is less certain than in the states with
wholesale bars on public sector collective bargaining.
Arizona, Colorado, and Idaho do not have statutes on public sector
collective bargaining, but they do have executive orders or attorney general
guidelines that permit the practice. 153 Generally, these guidelines leave
regulation of collective bargaining to the discretion of the municipality.154
This too would limit the viability of incarcerated workers unions gaining
formal recognition and labor protections. It might also lead to a fragmented
approach on the part of advocates and organizers with no clear statewide
precedent emerging across municipalities.
This leaves thirty states that statutorily permit collective bargaining and
have definitions of “public employee” that do not explicitly exclude
prisoners. Of these, many have generic definitions, with few exceptions or
qualifications. One characteristic example from Alaska states, “‘public
employee’ means any employee of a public employer, whether or not in the
classified service of the public employer, except elected or appointed
officials or superintendents of schools.” 155 In states with similar statutes,
incarcerated worker unions should make the case to the state labor relations
board that they are public workers in much the same way that incarcerated
workers in private industries might petition the NLRB.
Among those states that permit collective bargaining for public
employees, some have especially expansive definitions. This may open up
even greater opportunities. For example, North Dakota’s Public Employees
Relations Act defines an employee as “any person, whether employed,
appointed, or under contract, providing services for the state, county, city, or
151

SANES & SCHMITT, supra note 145, at 12, 40, 65.
IND. CODE § 36-8-22 (Burns, LEXIS through 1st Reg. Sess. of 121st Gen. Assembly);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 67A.6902 (LEXIS through 2019); 11 OKLA. STAT. § 51–101 (Westlaw
through 1st Reg. Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49–101 (2019).
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Id. at 27.
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other political subdivision, for which compensation is paid.” 156 While the
section includes six exceptions to its definition of public employee, none of
these include prisoners. 157 Under the canon of construction expresio unius
est exclusio alterius, the omission of prisoners from the excluded classes of
public employee indicates that they could be included in the definition of
public employees. However, it does not appear that prisoner labor unions
have ever sought to form in North Dakota. 158
A smaller subset of states have much more restrictive definitions of
public employees that—while not explicitly excluding prisoners—may pose
additional obstacles. These include California, Hawaii, Maryland, and
Vermont. 159 For example, Vermont’s code grants much more discretion to
its labor relations board: exempt from the definition of public employee is
any group “determined after a hearing by the Board, upon petition of any
individual desiring exclusion, of the employer, or of a collective bargaining
unit, to be in a position that is so inconsistent with the spirit and intent of this
chapter as to warrant exclusion.” 160 California, Hawaii, and Maryland each
have very clearly defined lists of who is and who is not a public employee.
Although incarcerated workers do not appear on either the list of included or
excluded public employees, their absence leaves less interpretive leeway for
the Boards in these states, even if they were amenable to extending public
employee benefits to incarcerated workers. As a result, incarcerated workers
unions may not wish to prioritize these states in their organizing. This is a
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N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-11.1-01(3) (LEXIS through 2019 Reg. Legis. Sess.).
Id.
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In addition to its broad statutory definition of a public employee, North Dakota may
be an interesting place for incarcerated workers unions to test the waters for several reasons:
the current head of North Dakota’s Department of Corrections is experimenting with
Scandinavian-style prison reforms; it also has less of a history of race-based prison gangs due
to its homogeneity. See Dashka Slater, North Dakota’s Norway Experiment, MOTHER JONES
(July 2017), https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2017/07/north-dakota-norway-priso
ns-experiment/ [https://perma.cc/AP39-R9PN]. However, just because North Dakota’s prison
system might be reasonably amenable to reforms, other stakeholders such as the courts and
the labor relations board would also have to be favorably disposed to incarcerated worker
unions. The political calculus involved in determining whether these entities or their
counterparts in other states might be open to recognizing collective bargaining rights for
incarcerated workers is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3513 (Deering 2018); HAW. REV. STAT. § 89–6 (Westlaw
through Act 286 of 2019 Legis. Sess.); MD. STATE PERS. & PENS. CODE § 3–102 (LEXIS
through 2019 Reg. Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 3, § 902 (LEXIS through 2019 Reg. Sess.
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shame because of California’s long, rich history with prison organizing161
and its large prison population. 162
Though state statutes governing collective bargaining for public
employees take a range of approaches—from banning collective bargaining
wholesale to having broad definitions of who may be considered a public
employee—there is considerable opportunity for incarcerated workers in
thirty states. Each one of these states’ public employee relations boards will
likely take a different approach to interpreting its statute as it applies to
incarcerated workers. To that end, it is useful to consider the past decisions
of some of these agencies.
C. STATE LABOR BOARD DECISIONS ON INCARCERATED
WORKERS

The issue of whether incarcerated workers are state employees has come
up in front of the labor boards of at least four states, only one of which has
found in favor of their collective bargaining rights.
In the successful petition, the Massachusetts State Labor Relations
Commission approved members of the National Prisoners Reform
Association (NPRA) at Walpole Prison as a collective bargaining unit, noting
that “the prisoners did perform work for which they were paid by the
state.” 163 The Commission went on to identify thirty-one different work
assignments engaged in by prisoners. 164 This shows that it is not entirely
fantastical to imagine that some states may approve collective bargaining for
incarcerated workers.
To determine which approaches and arguments may work today, it is
also informative to examine the three unsuccessful cases and understand the
reasons that state labor boards have declined to find inmates to be public
employees.
In the earliest of these cases, incarcerated workers at Green Haven
Prison petitioned New York’s Public Employment Relations Board to be
recognized as public employees. 165 The Board found that incarcerated
161

See Part II.A., supra.
As of 2017, California had approximately 115,000 prisoners. California’s Prison
Population, PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA, https://www.ppic.org/publication/calif
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Heather Ann Thompson, Rethinking Working Class Struggle through the Lens of the
Carceral State: Toward a Labour History of Inmates and Guards, in GLOBAL CONVICT
LABOUR 411 (Christian Giuseppe De Vito & Alex Lichtenstein eds., 2015).
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workers had many attributes of an employee relationship with the state
Department of Corrections, but that New York’s “Taylor Law,” which
provided labor protections to public employees, was not intended to cover
prisoners. 166 This decision came, in part, from examining New York’s State
Corrections Law, which says that state employment law applies to inmates
on work-release programs. 167 Because of the recognition that employment
law applied to prisoners in this specific circumstance, the Public Relations
Board found that inmates were excluded in more general circumstances. 168
Based on this decision, incarcerated workers seeking recognition as public
employees in any state will want to consider whether other state labor statutes
make exceptions for certain classes of inmates but not for others.
Michigan’s Employment Relations Commission took a different
approach in evaluating the merits of a prisoners’ labor union, finding an
employment relationship but dismissing the petition for lack of statutory
jurisdiction. 169 The union appealed, and ultimately the Michigan Court of
Appeals found that the primary relationship between incarcerated workers
and the Department of Corrections was rehabilitative and penological, not
vocational. 170 As a result, Michigan’s Public Employment Relations Act did
not cover the union, and their disputes instead had to be resolved within the
Department of Corrections. 171
At the federal level, the NLRB has oscillated on the issue of whether
employees may have more than one type of relationship with their employer
(most recently, away from embracing the dual-relationship argument). 172
However, the NLRB’s decisions are not binding over state labor relations
boards because of their distinct mandates. As discussed above in the case of
the NPRA in Massachusetts, some state labor relations boards may be more
favorably inclined to find incarcerated workers both inmates and laborers.
Finally, Ohio’s State Employment Relations Board (SERB) found that
inmates were not public employees. 173 When the inmates appealed, a state
166
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court agreed that the SERB did not have jurisdiction over the inmates. 174 The
main reason for this was that the relationship between the inmates and the
prison was not voluntary, and thus incarcerated workers could not be
considered employees under state law. 175 While the Sixth Circuit, which
includes Ohio, has not weighed in the matter, the Second, Fifth, and Ninth
Circuits have found that incarcerated workers’ status as inmates does not
exclude them per se from labor protections. 176 Indeed, these circuits have
found that voluntariness is not the most critical factor, and instead that
“determination of employee status focuses on economic reality and economic
dependence.” 177 The majority of the decisions on this matter came after
Ohio’s ruling and could provide some strong counterarguments to challenge
Ohio’s Appeals Court’s finding that voluntariness alone is sufficient to
exclude inmates from labor laws. 178
Ultimately, these cases illustrate the range of statuses that states may
ascribe to incarcerated workers under state collective bargaining statutes and
indicate several arguments that modern incarcerated worker unions could
advance to seek legal recognition. The approach in any of the thirty states
that permit collective bargaining and do not explicitly exclude prisoners will
surely vary widely based on the nature of the individual union, the totality of
a state’s other laws governing corrections, past decisions by the state labor
board, and state-level jurisprudence around the definition of a public
employee. However, the broader point is that in some states, incarcerated
workers may be able to pass the threshold issue of being recognized as public
employees—though it will surely be an uphill battle in most cases.179
174
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Id. at *2. Interestingly, this decision contrasts the language in Ohio’s Workmen’s
Compensation Law (Ohio Rev. Code § 4123) to Ohio’s Public Employment Collective
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CONCLUSION
Justice Brandeis wrote that states may “serve as a laboratory[] and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.” 180 Incarcerated worker unions can use the differences in state
collective bargaining statutes and various state labor boards’ attitudes to their
advantage. By gaining certification under state collective bargaining
statutes, workers can build a body of knowledge demonstrating the viability
of prisoner labor organizing. Unions in different states can experiment with
distinct approaches to seeking recognition from their state labor relations
board and learn from each other’s successes and failures.
Between seeking state-level recognition as public employee collective
bargaining units and seeking federal private-sector recognition through the
NLRB, incarcerated workers have numerous avenues to pursue in order to
achieve labor protections and union recognition.
Following such
recognition, successful and peaceful negotiations between unions and prison
administrators can ultimately create an evidence base that can one day be
used to rebut the argument advanced by Justice Rehnquist in Jones that “the
presence, perhaps even the objectives, of a prisoners’ labor union is
detrimental to the order and security in the prisons.” 181
By utilizing the complementary approaches of seeking recognition
under federal and state labor laws, incarcerated workers can chart a path
forward that allows them to address concerns about power imbalances, racial
inequity, and labor exploitation posed by prison labor. While incarcerated
workers may not presently have a constitutional freedom of association, they
have other tools at their disposal with which they can seek to assert their
rights. As Pete Seeger sang in Talking Union, a song describing the steps
workers must take to start a union, “You may be down and out, but you ain’t
beaten.” 182
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